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"'  Jt PREA:MBLE 
The Evaluation of EU Aid to  ACP Countries  is  part of a general evaluation of EU aid  requested by the 
Development Council in June 1995.  The second phase of the study focuses on:  (I) policy formulation; (ii) 
policy dialogue between the EC and individual ACP states; and (iii) aid implementation and management. 
The country reports look at  policy dialogue and aid implementation in  six countries and one region 
concentrating on 3 sectors of European Community assistance in each country. The present report is 
on Zimbabwe.  The other six reports cover Tanzania, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Jamaica and 
the East Caribbean.  The sectors of concentration for Zimbabwe are structural adjustment, agriculture 
and trade development. 
This study  report  is  based  on  the  findings  from  a  visit of a  team of consultants  undertaken  from 
February 21  to March 11,  1998.  The field- work was preceded by an analysis of available evaluations 
in the sectors of concentration as well as other available documents on EC Aid to Zimbabwe.  The in-
country field work was organised around: 
•  the review of project files; 
•  interviews with EC Delegation staff; 
•  interviews with Government officials 
•  interviews with Member States and  donors' representatives; 
•  interviews  with beneficiaries and NGOs; 
•  wrap-up meeting with Member States; and 
•  wrap-up meeting with Delegation staff. 
The draft report was presented in  May  1998 to the Working Group of Heads of Evaluation Services 
(Development) of the European Union and the Commission. 
The evaluation team is  grateful for the support of the EC Delegation, and for the collaboration of the 
Government and representatives of other donors, particularly Member States. 
C.  Montes 
ACP Evaluation Field Phase Coordinator 
Those wishing to  obtain copies of the  synthesis report or the  other case studies should contact the 
Head of  the Evaluation Unit,  Common Service Relex of  the European Commission. Executive Summary 
EXECUTIVESU~RY 
A. Country Context 
Zimbabwe is a land-locked country with a well 
diversified  economy.  Since  achieving 
independence  in  1980,  Zimbabwe's  political 
system has been dominated by  one party,  but 
competing  political  groupings  are  active. 
While opposition parties are  small and  poorly 
organised, trade unions are more influential. 
Zimbabwe's  economy,  albeit  diversified  by 
Sub-Saharan  Africa's  standards,  is  still  very 
much  dependent  on  agriculture.  In  the  first 
decade  after  independence,  Zimbabwe  had  a 
highly  regulated  command  economy  with  a 
strong anti-export  bias.  In  1991,  Zimbabwe 
embarked  on  a  Structural  Adjustment 
Programme  supported  by  the  Bretton  Woods 
institutions  and  other  donors.  Trade 
liberalisation  and  domestic  deregulation  have 
made good progress, but difficulties remain in 
other  areas.  Fiscal  reform  and  the  Social 
Dimensions  of  the  Adjustment  Programme 
have been disappointing.  The role of the State 
in the economy is still substantial. and political 
and economic rigidities make the environment 
open  to  corruption,  which  is  a  growing 
concern among donors. 
Aid  inflows,  at  about  10%  of  GOP,  are 
important for  Zimbabwe,  but  less  so  than  for 
other  African  countries.  Net  official 
development assistance in real terms is  now at 
the  same  level  as  in  the  years  immediately 
following  independence.  Total  EU  aid, 
Member  States  and  EC,  accounts  for  two 
thirds  of  total  aid.  EC  aid  accounts  for  a 
quarter  of total  EU  aid.  EC  aid  has  grown 
steadily, with disbursements averaging ecu 70 
million  a year in  the  period  1994-1996.  The 
focus  of EC  aid  has  shifted  over  time,  from 
emergency  assistance  in  the  early  1980s  to 
rural development from  the  mid-1980s  to  the 
early  1990s,  and  to  structural adjustment and 
the  social  sectors  (i.e.  health  and  education) 
thereafter.  The  second half of the  1990s has 
also  witnessed  the  beginning of a  shift  from 
project to programme aid. 
EC  aid  is  managed  jointly  by  the  National 
Authorising Officer (PS  Ministry  of Finance) 
and  the  EC  Delegation.  The NAO  office  is 
part  of  the  Department  of  Domestic  and 
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International Finance, the  unit responsible for 
co-ordinating  all  external  assistance  to 
Zimbabwe.  The unit is  very  professional but 
has  insufficient capacity.  In  the  case of EU 
aid,  it  relies  on  the  assistance  of  the 
Delegation's  National  Programme  Officers 
and some Technical Assistance.  Compared to 
other  EC  Delegations,  the  Delegation  in 
Zimbabwe  appears  relatively  well  staffed, 
although  it  has  fewer  professional  staff than 
some  Member  States'  in-country 
representations.  Delegation  advisers  operate 
without clear terms  of reference  and  there  is 
often  a  mismatch  between  skills  and 
assignments.  Contacts with Headquarters and 
with other Delegations which provide valuable 
working  networks  are  limited.  Delegation 
staff  are  over-burdened  by  complex 
administrative tasks,  which are carried out at 
the  expense  of strategic  thinking  and  policy 
dialogue. 
B. Policy Dialogue 
Given  the  significant  EU aid  for  Zimbabwe, 
the EC and Member States could play a greater 
role  in  policy  dialogue  and  donor  co-
ordination.  The role  of the EC  is  limited by 
staffing  and  administrative  constraints. 
However, co-ordination with other donors has 
been  good  although  restricted  to  sharing 
information.  There are few  examples of joint 
donor  operations.  Recently  there  has  been 
some  progress  (e.g.  the  participation  of  the 
Delegation in  negotiations on the Agricultural 
Sector  Management  Programme,  and  the 
Delegation's  increased  role  in  the  overall 
economic d1alogue). Moreover, the Delegation 
expects that appraisals, evaluations and audits 
in  the  health, education and trade sectors will 
in  future  be undertaken jointly with  Member 
States,  wherever  possible.  SIDA' s  recent 
programming exercise has  been based on  co-
ordination  and  complementarity  with  other 
donors. 
Policy dialogue with the Government has been 
influenced by  the strength of the ci  vii service 
and  by  Zimbabwe's  limited  dependence  on 
foreign  aid.  In  the past,  the Government has 
often decided not to engage in policy dialogue 
in politically sensitive areas.  The Government has had considerable ownership of the reform 
process. 
The policy  dialogue between  the  EC  and  the 
Government has  been strengthened during the 
last  five  years.  The  latest  programming 
exercise was carefully planned and conducted 
through  extensive  high  level  consultations. 
However,  because  of  pressures  from  many 
sides,  it  was  not  sufficiently  focused. 
Delegation  staff  were  the  leaders  in  the 
exercise,  and  they  ensured  that  there  was 
effective consultation with Member States. 
Policy  dialogue  on  stabilisation  and 
adjustment reforms was mainly carried out by 
the  Bretton  Woods  Institutions.  There  is 
adequate  co-ordination  between  BWI  and 
other donors.  However, some Member States 
expressed  their  concerns  that  BWI's 
programmes  were  often  over-optimistic  in 
their  assumptions.  The  EC' s  Structural 
Adjustment  Support  Programme  represents 
about  40  percent  of  total  commitments  to 
Zimbabwe (EDF 7).  The EC Delegation had 
the  capacity  to  monitor  macroeconomic  and 
adjustment  reforms.  However,  the  complex 
implementation  modality  of  the  SASP 
(targeting of projects) contributed to the over-
stretching  of  the  Delegation's  capacity, 
making it difficult to carry out strategic policy 
dialogue,  particularly  on  the  reform  of  the 
social  sectors.  The  Delegation  has  recently 
begun to engage the Government in a dialogue 
intended to  improve the  budgetary process in 
the social sectors.  The good working relations 
between  the  EC  and  the  Government  should 
facilitate this dialogue. 
Sector policy dialogue has  been limited in  the 
past but this has begun to change.  Agriculture 
projects were pilot projects  that did not focus 
on  policy  issues.  The  Micro-Projects 
Programme was  very  successful but  involved 
limited  policy  discussion.  Trade  policy 
discussions  in  the  context  of  the  ZimTrade 
project have suffered from the limited capacity 
of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and 
from  insufficient  involvement  of the  private 
sector. 
The policy dialogue on  institutional reform in 
the agricultural sector (ASMP) has  shown the 
potential  of EC  interventions.  The  EC  has 
played an  effective role as  facilitator for both 
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the  Government  and  other  donors.  The 
Government  perceives  the  EC  to  be  a 
relatively  neutral  technical  donor.  Other 
donors also respect the professionalism of EC 
sectoral  staff and  the  quality  of a  number of 
their sector interventions  (e.g.  Micro-Projects 
Programme). 
The  Delegation  advisers  seem  to  be  very 
aware  of  the  need  to  incorporate  poverty, 
gender.  environment  and  governance  issues 
into their interventions.  These issues are often 
discussed  in  the  regular operational  meetings 
between the  Delegation and the Government. 
There  has  been  some  progress  on  poverty 
issues.  For example, poverty alleviation is  the 
key  objective  of  the  latest  programming 
exercise.  However, the EC's ability to address 
these  key  issues  is  limited  by  staffing 
constraints,  by  the  volume  of administrative 
work  and  policy  initiatives,  and  by  the 
Government's capacity.  These difficulties are 
shared  by  other  donors  in  Zimbabwe. 
However, the EC's Micro-Projects Programme 
shows a successful way to address poverty and 
gender issues in a direct manner. 
C. Aid Implementation 
The overall co-ordination of EC aid  is  carried 
out by the NAO office.  The EC Delegation's 
monthly  meeting  with  the  NAO  Office  is 
extremely  useful  in  monitoring  project 
implementation.  The meeting is  attended  by 
all  advisors  and  NPOs,  by  the  NAO  Office 
staff,  and  by  all  line  Ministries  and 
implementing agencies  involved  in  managing 
EC aid.  As a result, all parties responsible for 
project implementation are gathered round the 
same table.  Where problems involve several 
parties,  solutions  are  often  found  at  this 
meeting. 
At the project level, institutional arrangements 
for project implementation involve three types 
of structure:  fully  integrated, parastatal (as  in 
ZimTrade)  programme  and  parallel 
management  (as  in  the  Micro-projects 
Programme).  The first structure appears to be 
the  most  sustainable,  although  all  three 
approaches  require  the  use  of external  T A. 
Some  implementation  structures  in  EC 
projects  are  complex  and  some  involve  too 
many  agenc~es.  In such cases, creating a co-ordination unit  or a  Steering Committee  may 
simply add to the complexity. 
While the initiative to prepare a project usually 
originates  from  the  Delegation,  in  general 
there  has  been  adequate  involvement  of host 
agencies in  the design process.  However, the 
involvement  of direct  beneficiaries  has  been 
weak.  An  exception  is  the  Micro-Projects 
Programme,  which  is  by  definition  a  quick-
disbursing  programme  geared  to  direct 
requests by communities. 
Project preparation can be  strongly influenced 
by  external  consultants.  While  the  use  of 
external  consultants  in  all  stages  of project 
preparation  is  common for  most  donors,  the 
influence  of their  work  on  the  final  product 
depends  on  the  Government's  and  donor's 
ability to  manage such consultants, which has 
been insufficient at  times.  In  some cases, the 
insufficient  management  of  consultants  can 
explain why project preparation overlooks the 
implementation  capacity  of  the  EC  and  of 
local counterparts. 
Most  projects  have  suffered  from  delays  in 
implementation.  In agriculture, for example, a 
recent evaluation found persistent delays in the 
Annual  Work  Programme  and  Budget 
Estimates and  in  the  recruitment  of technical 
assistance  personnel.  In  addition  to 
insufficiently  clear  implementation 
arrangements,  delays  are  attributed  to  the 
inexperience  of  project  managers  in  the 
financial  and reporting procedures  of the  EC. 
A  simple  check  on  three  projects,  using  the 
reference  time  limits  set  out  in  the  detailed 
evaluation  by  Price  Waterhouse  in  1992, 
showed delays longer than the reference limits, 
although  only  one  instance  was  beyond  the 
maximum limits set out by the evaluation. 
The EC is  not alone in  experiencing delays in 
implementation.  The  last  Country  Portfolio 
Performance Review by the World Bank found 
that  projects  had  suffered  from  delays  in 
project  start-up  (up  to  two  years),  in 
procurement  (particularly  for  large  contracts 
where  decisions  need  to  be  vetted  by  the 
President's  Office),  and  in  submission  of 
financial audits (due to  "a capacity issue both 
in  terms  of  accounting  in  implementing 
agencies and audit capacity at the Office of the 
Auditor General"). 
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The  implementation  and  monitoring  of  EC 
interventions  has  been  affected  by  the 
extensive  nature  of  EC  ex  ante  financial 
controls. In this context, much less emphasis is 
given to  monitoring project performance or ex 
post financial  audits.  We examined a  sample 
of fourteen EDF 7 projects to determine what 
share  of  the  total  amount  disbursed  as  of 
December 31, 1997 had been subject to ex post 
controls.  We  found  that  only  21%  of 
expenditures had been fully audited.  Because 
of  EC  financial  arrangements  and 
requirements  from  Member  States,  ex  ante 
financial  controls  are  applied  without 
selectivity.  Out of 480 procurement decisions 
under EDF 6 and 7, a quarter (those above ecu 
100,000)  accounted  for  84%  of  the  total 
amount  of ecu  involved.  As  economies  of 
scale  in  procurement  and  disbursement 
decisions  are  minimal,  a  move  towards 
removing  ex  ante  controls  for  procurement 
decisions  below  ecu  100,00  while  extending 
financial audits to all expenditures under EDF-
funded  programmes  would  save  considerable 
staff time. 
The effect of these controls is that the limited 
numbers  of  EC  staff  spend  a  substantial 
amount  of time  verifying  every  expenditure. 
We  estimated  that  the  amount  of time  spent 
processing  payment  orders  in  1997  was  1.5 
person  years  at  the  Delegation  and  1 at  the 
NAO office.  This  is  in  addition  to  the  time 
spent  by  staff  in  Headquarters  on  direct 
payments. 
Given  the  weakness  of  some  implementing 
agencies,  it  is  very  difficult  for  Delegation 
advisors  not to  become  project co-managers. 
A  recent  evaluation  noted  that:  "Routine 
supervision  of a  constructive  nature ....  does 
not appear to have been a feature of the project 
portfolio.  For the Delegation, there appears to 
have  been  a  fine  line  between  their 
unavoidable  responsibilities  for  financial  and 
contractual  administration  related  to  projects 
and  direct  involvement  in  managerial  and 
technical issues." 
In  this  context,  monitoring  and  mid-term 
evaluation  has  been  weak  in  EC  projects. 
Mid-term  evaluations,  if  included  in  the 
project  design,  have  not  been  carried  out 
punctually.  A recent evaluation on agriculture noted  a  general  absence  of  coherent 
monitoring.  Another  evaluation  in  trade 
development  found  that  "elements  of  the 
budget  are  incomprehensible.  ( ...  )  ZSP 
produces annual and quarterly progress reports 
( ...  ) resulting in  little or no  feed-back,  so  the 
Programme  proceeds  as  it  set  out  with  only 
minor  corrections  to  its  direction." 
Operational and financial information is  often 
available but not analysed. 
One of the strengths of EC managed aid is  the 
regularity of ex post evaluations carried out by 
independent evaluators and shared widely with 
Government and other donors.  All the sectors 
that this study focused on  had been evaluated 
in the previous  12  months.  These evaluations 
are  appreciated  by  EC  staff.  However, 
because  of  administrative  constraints,  while 
EC  staff  have  taken  important  steps  to 
incorporate evaluation lessons in the design of 
new  operations,  this  has  been  a  difficult 
process. 
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CHAPTER I.  COUNTRY CONTEXT 
A.  Country Background 
Country Details 
Zimbabwe is  a landlocked country situated between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers, 
covering an  area of 391,000 square  kilometres  bordered  by  Zambia to  the  north  and 
north-west, by South Africa to the south, by Mozambique to the east, and by Botswana 
to  the  south-west.  With  a  population  of 11  million,  which  is  growing at  2.5%  per 
annum,  Zimbabwe  has  an  annual  per  capita  GDP  of  US$540  ( 1995)  and  a  well 
diversified  economy.  Almost  a  third  of  the  population  lives  in  urban  areas  and 
agriculture accounts for only 15% of GDP. 
Zimbabwe was colonised by  the British South Africa Company under Cecil Rhodes in 
the  1890s.  The territory  became part of the  federation  of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 
1953.  The federation  broke up  in  1963  with the independence of Malawi and Zambia 
and  in  November  1965  Prime  Minister Ian  Smith  issued  a  Unilateral  Declaration  of 
Independence from  the  United  Kingdom.  The Smith Government  instituted apartheid-
like  policies  and  practised  racial  discrimination.  The  UDI  led  the  United  Nations  to 
impose its first mandatory economic sanctions on a State.  Guerrilla activity began in the 
late 1960s and increased dramatically after 1972, causing substantial destruction. 
After several failed rounds of negotiations between 1976 and 1979, the Lancaster House 
talks led to the re-assertion of British authority over the colony on December 10, 1979; a 
cease-fire, new elections and a new constitution on December 21,  1979; and Zimbabwe's 
independence on April 18,  1980.  The new Constitution provided for a Westminster-style 
government (i.e., bicameral Parliament and a Prime Minister who heads the Executive). 
It also:  (a)  made nationalisation of land impractical and expropriation unconstitutional 
("willing buyer-willing seller" provision) and (b) guaranteed an  over-representation of 
whites in Parliament for the first seven years after Independence. 
Table 1 - Main Features of Zimbabwe's Political System 
Feature  Details 
Independence  April 18, 1980 
Constitutional Structure  Executive Presidency 
Single-Chamber Parliament 
Parties represented in Parliament  ZANU PF (Ruling Party): 148 seats 
ZM  U Ndonga (Opposition): 2 seats 
Opposition  Parties  not  represented  m  Z~.UP,FPZ,DP,FDP 
Parliament 
In  1987, two major constitutional changes were passed: an executive presidency (with an 
unlimited  term  in  office)  was  introduced  and  racial  representation  in  Parliament  was 
abolished.  In  1990,  the  bicameral  parliament  was  replaced  with  a  single-chamber 
parliament, the House of Assembly. 
Zimbabwe's  political  structure  is  characterised  by  a  de-facto  one-party  system  with 
ZANU (PF) controlling 148 of the  150 seats.
1 However, there is active  participation of 
competing political  groupings.  While opposition parties  are  small,  poorly  funded  and 
organised, the trade unions are becoming stronger and are often critical of government 
1 Of  the 150 seats, only 120 are elective. 
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policies.  ZANU-PF Central  Committee  has  a  very  strong  influence  on  government, 
although its decisions are rarely made public. 
"The  relationship  between  party  and  government  is  important  in  the 
Zimbabwean  political  structure.  The  party  is  defined  as  the  body  that 
establishes  the  general  direction  of government  and has  major influence  in 
government." 
2 
Zimbabwe is  not  one of the  poorest countries  in  Africa but its  income distribution is 
extremely unequal.  Income distribution can be used  as  an  indicator of poverty 3,  and 
Zimbabwe has  the sixth  most unequal income distribution among the 85 countries for 
which this  measure was  calculated.  Only 4 countries (Brazil, Guatemala, South Africa 
and  Kenya)  out of 65  have  a  Gini  index  higher than  Zimbabwe (WDR,  1996).  Civil 
unrest has  been growing in  the  last  year.  The issues of deteriorating living standards, 
democratisation and redistribution of land are at the forefront of the political debate. 
The Economy 
Zimbabwe  is  one  of the  most  industrialised  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa 
4  with 
manufactured  exports  accounting  for  40%  of the  total.  However,  Zimbabwe  is  still 
highly dependent on the agricultural sector, providing almost 70% of employment, 19% 
of  GDP and  35%  of exports  while  up to  60% of the  manufacturing value-added is 
related  to  the  agro-industry.  Zimbabwean agriculture  has  a  dualistic  structure,  with 
4,500 large-scale farms  covering more than half of high potential land and one million 
smallholders farming mainly in arid and semi-arid areas.  The main exports are tobacco, 
gold, iron products, sugar, nickel and cotton.  Although landlocked, Zimbabwe is linked 
to the rest of the world by a good network of roads, railways and airlines. 
In  the first decade after independence, Zimbabwe had a highly control}ed economy with 
an  anti-export bias.  To reduce socio-economic disparities, the ZANU PF Government 
invested  heavily  in  health  and  education  and,  through  parastatals,  in  agriculture and 
industry.  Public expenditures soared, remaining at 45% of GDP for most of the  1980s. 
While  social  indicators  improved,  per capita  income  stagnated  and  population  grew 
faster than jobs, thus  widening income disparities.  In  1992, Zimbabwe embarked on a 
programme for structural adjustment supported by the IMF, the World Bank, the EC and 
other donors. 
Table 2 - Key Economic Indicators 
Indicators  Latest Value  Average Rate of 
(1995)  Growth 
(1990-95) 
GNP per capita  US$540  -0.5% (1985-95) 
Population  11m.  2.5% 
GDP  US$6,522 m.  1.0% 
Gross Domestic Investment  22% ofGDP  0.2% 
Exports  US$2,372 m.  -6.6% 
Imports  US$2,836 m.  -5.1% 
Overall Budget Deficit  7% ofGDP 
Official Development  10.1% of GOP 
Assistance 
NPV of External Debt  69% of GNP 
2  Deborah  A.  Sanders  in  Joel  Krieger  (  ed. ),  The  Oxford  Companion  to  Politics  of the  World,  Oxford 
Universitv Press,  1993. 
3  Resear~h by  the  World  Bank found  "a  statistically  significant  negative  correlation  between  standard 
deviation of  income distribution and the share of  income held by the lowest quintile" of  the population. 
4 The manufacturing sector contributes over 30% of  GDP,  three times the SSA average. 
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A severe drought hit Zimbabwe in  1992 causing the worst recession since independence. 
Nevertheless,  the  Government was  able  to. achieve  significant  results  in  deregulation
5 
and  trade  liberalisation
6  in  the  period  1991-94.  Performance  has  instead  been 
unsatisfactory  in  fiscal  reform,  where  government  spending  remained  too  high  and 
parastatal and civil  service reforms  moved too slowly, thus  impeding the  reduction of 
budget deficits.  Budget cuts on social spending have hit the poor hardest. 
State  intervention  in  the  economy  is  still  substantial,  although  slowly  declining. 
Government expenditure fell  from  42.5%  to  39.7% of GDP between  1991  and  1996. 
The combined deficits of the ten major public enterprises also declined from 4 to  1% of 
GDP between 1994 and 1996. 
Governance and Public Administration. 
Zimbabwe's political system, with its identification of party and state, results in limited 
public accountability,  which  facilitates  corruption.  In this  context,  the  high degree of 
state intervention and the state's discretion in applying regulations have also contributed 
to  corruption 
7
.  There  is  a  perception  in  the  donor  community  that  corruption . is 
becoming a serious issue in  Zimbabwe.  However, many donor representatives feel that 
corruption  is  still  lower than  in  other African  countries.  Donors  gave  examples  of 
possible high level corruption relating to foreign  investment and procurement of goods 
and  works.  However, petty corruption  appears  less  widespread  in  Zimbabwe than  in 
many other African countries. 
The Zimbabwean civil service is stronger than those of many other African countries. Its 
salaries appear closer to those of the private sector.  Zimbabwe's wage bill is also quite 
high by international standards ( 12% of the GDP).  In recent years, the civil service has 
been  reduced by  20,000.  The efforts  to  streamline the  civil  service  will  be  based on 
devolution  of  central  government  responsibilities  to  local  governments  and  the 
commercialisation of some Government departments. 
B.  The Management of International Aid 
In-Country Aid Agency Representations 
All major donors and international organisations are represented in Harare.  In 1996, the 
EC was the largest donor followed by Japan, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Norway.  Thirteen EU Member States have diplomatic missions 
in  Zimbabwe.  Donors have very different  organisat~onal set-ups.  The Netherlands, for 
example, has fully decentralised decision making on aid programming and management. 
Other donors  with  a  fairly  decentralised set up  include DfiD (whose office  in  Harare 
covers four countries), DANIDA, and SIDA.  Centralised structures however seem to be 
still  the  prevailing  set  up.  The  main  features  of some  donors  we  interviewed  are 
summarised in Table 3 overleaf. 
5 Removal of  price controls and of  most investment licensing, dismantling of  public monopoly on marketing 
~1  agn'cultural commodities, liberalisation of  the financial sector. 
Dismantling of  foreign exchange controls on current accounts and removal of  import licensing. 
7 Corruption is defined by Prof Klitgaard as monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. 
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Table 3-Features of Some Donors Operating in Zimbabwe 
Indicator  Netherlands  Germano;  Denmark  France  SIDA  DFID  World Bank 
Focal Sectors  Education  Agriculture  Agriculture  Water  Health  Health 
Health  Rural roads  Health  Telecom  Education  Agriculture 
Rural  Feeder Roads  Energy  Public  Infrastructure 
Develop.  Telecom  Admin.  SME 
Environment  Environment  Transport  Development 
No. of Higher Level Staff  8 HQ  3 HQ
1
·  6HQ  3 HQ  9 HQ  20HQ  4HQ 
4 Local  1 Local  3 Local  4 Local 
Countries (beyond  Botswana  None  Botswana  Zambia  6 other  None  None 
Zimbabwe)  Malawi  countries 
Angola 
Net disbursements (  Mecu)  25  20  16  5  28  20 
- 1996 
Aid is constant 
andEU 
accounts for 
1/3 of total 
Government 
at the centre 
of aid co-
ordination 
I.  This figure is  not easily comparable.  German aid is implemented through agencies (GTZ and KtW). 
Note: Indicative table. Based on interviews. HQ= Expatriate higher level staff in field office. 
Role and Importance of  International Aid. 
As shown in Figure 1 international aid to Zimbabwe is back at the same level it reached 
immediately after independence. There have been two peaks in international aid: one in 
the early 1980s when the country needed to recover from the civil war and a second after 
Zimbabwe embarked on ESAP and was  hit  by  a  severe drought.  At 10.1%  of GNP, 
Zimbabwe has the second lowest ratio of ODA to GNP among low-income Sub-Saharan 
African  countries.  This  ratio  is  similar  to  those  of  other  relatively  industrialised 
economies like Kenya or Ghana 
8
. Aid from Member States and the EC accounts for two 
thirds  of total  aid  to  the  country and its  share  has  been  fluctuating between 45% and 
65%.  The  relative  importance  of the  EC  vis-a-vis  the  EU Member States  has  been 
growing  steadily  from  5%  of total  European  aid  (EU and  EC  aid)  to  Zimbabwe  at 
Independence to 25% in  1996. 
Institutional Arrangements for Aid Management. 
The  Government  has  always  been  pro-active  in  co-ordinating  aid  programmes  and 
relations  with  individual  donors,  although  it  has  often  suffered  from  its  own  limited 
capacity.  Aid co-ordination is the responsibility of a unit within the Ministry of Finance, 
the  Department  for  Domestic  and  International  Finance  (DIF),  whose  structure  and 
functions  are  described in  the  next section.  Aid projects  need  to  be approved by the 
National Economic Planning Commission (NEPC) and any sectoral support is referred to 
the  relevant  line  ministry.  Key  decisions  are  referred  to  the  Presid~nt  Other  key 
decision  makers  in  aid  management  include  the  Minister of Finance,  the  Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, the Commissioner for Planning, and the Minister of Justice. 
There are several thematic groups for aid co-ordination organised by UNDP, although 
some donors noted  the  ineffectiveness and cost of such co-ordination efforts.  Donors 
mentioned that  informal co-ordination,  particularly among "like-minded" donors  (e.g., 
Nordic donors) tends to be more effective. 
8 World Development Report, 1996. 
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Figure 1 -Net Official Development Assistance to Zimbabwe (1981-96; 95 prices) 
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Source: DAC 
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CHAPTER II.  EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTANCE 
A.  Relative Size and Importance of EC Aid 
Informal contacts between the  EC and the new ZANU Government started  in  the late 
1970s,  enabling Zimbabwe  to  become  a  member of the  Lome  Convention extremeJy 
quickly after independence in  1980.  While formal co-operation started only under Lome 
II, humanitarian aid was initially provided under EU budget financing to assist the new 
Government in  the resettlement of refugees that had been victims of the civil war.  The 
EU is  now the  largest overseas market for Zimbabwe, and collectively the  EC and the 
Member States account for the largest share of aid to the country. 
The  size  and  allocation  of EC  aid  to  Zimbabwe  under successive Lome conventions 
since independence are shown in Table 4.  Several clear trends are visible:  ( 1)  EC aid 
has  grown  significantly  over  time;  (2)  financial  assistance  from  Em  has  remained 
relatively constant  (35-40% of EDF resources); (3) there has  been a shift from project 
aid to budget support; and (  4) aid focus has changed over time: emergency assistance in 
the early 1980s;  rural development from the mid-1980s to the early-1990s and structural 
adjustment and the social sectors (i.e., health and education) thereafter. 
Table 4  - Size and Allocation of EC Assistance to Zimbabwe 
Features  Lomeli  Lome III  Lome IV  Lome IV  his 
(  1981-1985)  (1986-1990)  (1991-1995)  (1996-2000) 
Size (Mecu)  110.0  180.9  340.2  N/A 
Of  which: 
•  NIP  49.0  77.0  91.5  110.0 
•  Other EDF & EIB  47.0  85.2  218.0  102.1 
•  Budf{et  14.0  18.7  30.7  N/A 
Sectoral Focus of NIP  •  Refugees  •  Refugees  •  Agriculture  •  Agriculture 
•  Rural  •  Rural  •  Health 
Development  Development  •  Education 
Source: DGVIII Annual Report 
1.  The table  includes  national  programmable  and  non-programmable  resources  and  budget  lines.  It excludes  resources  from  the 
Regional Indicative Programme. 
NAO Office  is 
integrated in 
MoF but 
limited 
capacity 
C.  Institutional Arrangements for EC Aid 
The ACP 
The NAO office is part of the Department of Domestic and International Finance (DIF), 
a  unit  of the  Ministry  of Finance responsible for  managing  all  external  assistance  to 
Zimbabwe.  The NAO is  the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, and has  six Deputy 
NAOs (i.e  .•  the Director of DIF, the head of DIF's Aid Co-ordination Section and four 
officers  from  the  Accountant  General's  Office  within  the  same  Ministry).  The 
subdivision  of responsibilities  between  DIF  and  the  Accountant  General's  Office  is 
simple: the latter is  responsible for all disbursement matters (e.g., preparing and signing 
payment  orders)  while  DIF  is  responsible  for  all  other  EDF issues.  DIF has  four 
sections: Aid Co-ordination, Loan, Commissioner of Insurance and Registrar of Banks. 
The Aid Co-ordination section comprises  si~ desk officers, of whom one is  responsible 
for EU (and Australian) aid. The other five desk officers are responsible for aid from the 
UN system and bilateral donors, while relations with the IMF and the World Bank are 
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within the responsibility of the Loan Section of DIF. There are also  two TAs assisting 
the section in  managing Stabex and SASP funds. 
Government officials praised the concept of partnership and generally found the EC easy 
to deal with  on  policy issues.  However, some Government officials noted that the EU-
ACP partnership has become more unequal over time, because of the different analytical 
capacities on the two sides.  They also note the complex procedures for procuring goods 
and services and disbursing funds.  In  general, the Ministry of Finance does not favour 
requests  from  donors  (including  the  EC)  to  disburse  funds  to  line  ministries  using 
revolving  funds  outside  the  normal  government  payment  system.  However,  line 
ministries (like  the Ministries of Health and Agriculture) are  more supportive of these 
requests. 
Delegation advisers believe that the NAO is doing an  effective job, although they noted 
that  its  capacity is  limited.  However,  they  are  aware that  more Technical Assistance 
could  compromise  government  ownership  and  normal  government  structures.  The 
location of NPOs in  the Delegation rather than in  the NAO office was also questioned. 
Other donors  also  noted  the  insufficient  staffing of the  Department of Domestic  and 
International Finance for donor co-ordination. 
The EC Delegation 
The EC Delegation in Zimbabwe has a professional staff of seven expatriate officials and 
a total staff of 29. The professional staff includes the Head of Delegation 
9
,  an economic 
adviser,  two  agricultural advisers,  a  technical  adviser,  an  administrative attache and a 
junior programme officer.  Local  staff in  the  Delegation is  made up of four National 
Programme Officers (NPOs) and eighteen support staff (accountants, secretaries, drivers, 
messengers, etc.)  NPOs were introduced in Zimbabwe as part of a pilot scheme to assist 
the NAO in  the implementation of development policy. They were to become part of the 
civil  service,  although  in  practice  they  usually end up  working for  the  private sector. 
NPOs signed their contracts with the Government of Zimbabwe. 
Most professional staff in the Delegation do not have terms of reference for their posts, 
and their roles and responsibilities are mostly defined on the basis of their predecessors' 
workload.  In some cases there is a mismatch between their professional background and 
their  areas  of  responsibilities  (especially  in  the  social  sectors).  Training  in  the 
Delegation seems to be limited. Visits from Headquarters staff are limited (e.g., because 
of budgetary constraints, the desk officer could only visit Zimbabwe once in  1997) and 
Delegation  staff  combine  training  and  visits  to  headquarters  with  home  leave.  As 
mentioned in the  1996 DAC review of all EC aid, 'for certain aspects, in particular social 
aspects, Women in  Development, population, environment and sectoral or cross-cutting 
issues,  the  EC  lacks  depth  and  expertise ....  Consequently,  the  staffmg  situation  for 
development co-operation in the EC remains questionable.' 
10 
The  EC  Delegation  seems  to  be  understaffed  when  compared  with  other  donors  in 
Zimbabwe, as  Table 5 below suggests.  While the data in this table is only indicative, 
the ratio of EC disbursements and staff is  higher than that of other donors.  (Germany, 
although a major donor in Zimbabwe, is excluded from this comparison because policy 
and implementation are carried out through separate channels.) 
11  The position has been vacant since December 1997. 
10 DAC, Development Cooperation Review Series:  European Community, No.  12,  Paris,  1996. 
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Table 5  • Disbursement-to- Staff Ratios for EC and Some Bilateral Donors 
Operating in Zimbabwe 
Indicator  EC ll  ·ECZI  DANJDA  SIDA  OFID  NL  FRANCE 
Disbursement 1n  MECU  20  39  16 
No. of HQ Staff 
31 
6  6  7 
No of Local Higher Level (HL) Staff 
31  4  4 
Total HL Staff  10  10  7 
Disbursement per HQ Staff  3.4  6.5  2.3 
Disbursement per HL Staff  2.0  3.9  2.3 
Source·  lntefYiews and DAC Database 
1/  Excludrng qud disbursrng ard (SASP, Stabex).  1996 data 
2J  Including qurck disbursing aid iSASP, Stabex).  1996 data. 
3/  In the case ol  regronaJ olfrces. total number of staff times the share of  Zimbabwe on total regronal disbursements 
28  20  26  5 
9  5  8  3 
4  2  4  3 
13  7  12  6 
3.1  4.0  3.2  1.7 
2.2  2.9  2.1  0.8 
The  problem  seems  to  be  aggravated  by  the  deployment  of EC  staff  in  too  many 
administrative tasks across too many interventions.  Our informal poll of EC Delegation 
staff showed that they spend almost 75  percent of their time dealing with administrative 
procedures rather than with strategic or policy issues (i.e. the challenging tasks are left to 
consultants).  The main problems in  dealing with Headquarters in Brussels seem to  be 
the lack of a "single chain of command in the relationship between the Delegations and 
the Commission Headquarters" 
11  and the little delegation of decisions.  Delegation staff 
also noted their limited budget and the uncompetitive pay for local staff. 
Member States: Co-ordination, Complementarity and Coherence
12 
In a country like Zimbabwe, where the EC and Member States are the largest donors, one 
would expect a major role of the EC in  the policy dialogue and aid co-ordination.  This 
has  not  happened  as  yet.  The  co-ordination  between  the  EC  and  other  donors  is 
generally good.  However, it  has  been mostly constrained to  the sharing of information 
and  has  generally  not  involved joint operations.  This is  due  to  different  development 
approaches of Member States and to their different institutional set-ups, both in  terms of 
staffing and decentralisation.  The thirteen Member States that have diplomatic missions 
in  Zimbabwe  hold  monthly  Heads  of  Missions  meetings,  and  quarterly  Economic 
Advisers and Development Counsellors meetings, 
13  but these meetings do not appear to 
be  very  effective  for  coordination  purposes.  The  Delegation  has  improved  its 
information  sharing  capabilities  by  holding  "open  houses"  and  providing  brief 
descriptions of their ongoing projects. 
Co-ordination seems  to  be  more effective among small  groups  of donors,  particularly 
when they tend to be more ''like minded" (e.g. Nordic countries).  It has also worked at a 
technical level, as  with the  institutional reforms in  the agricultural sector - EC,  DfiD, 
World Bank and  Germany (through GTZ).  The EC has also provided Member States 
with effective information on its monitoring of economic reforms.  The programming of 
SIDA aid  has  tried  to  take  into  account the  need for complementarity among donors. 
SIDA looked critically at its sectors of intervention through a series of workshops with 
11  European  Parliament  - Directorate  general  for  Research,  The  Management  Framework  of EU 
Delegations' Development Work  in  ACP Countries.  Case Study:  Zimbabwe,  External Economic Relations 
Series Working Document no.  18,  November 1997, p.  39.  This report was produced by an EP stagiaire and 
was strongly recommended to our Mission by the Delegation. 
12  Art.  J30x of the  Maastricht Treaty states that  "the Community and the Member States shall co-ordinate 
their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes,  including 
international  organisations  and  during  international  conferences. "  Other  important  principles  are 
coherence (Art.  130v of  the Treaty) and complementarity. The coherence of  EU policies will be addressed in 
the synthesis report. 
13  These meetings are organised by the EU Presidency. 
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stakeholders and donors and withdrew from sectors that were already well supported by 
others. 
In  the  present  environment  It  IS  difficult  to  ensure  that  donors'  policy  dialogue  or 
projects are  complementary (as  in  a  sector wide approach).  However, this  requires a 
more effective donor co-ordination that depends on the Government's sectoral capacity 
(and also donors' in-country sectoral expertise). 
As part of our interviews, EU donor representatives were asked to rate the work of the 
EC Delegation in policy dialogue, aid co-ordination and aid implementation.  The results 
are presented in Figure 3.  While the data need to be interpreted with caution given our 
small  sample,  the  representatives  of the  Member  States  found  the  Delegation  staff 
responsive and their aid relatively efficient.  However, they were less satisfied with the 
EC'  s policy dialogue and its aid co-ordination role. Some of these donors would favour a 
more active role of the Delegation in these areas. They also strongly support more joint 
appraisals and evaluations.  However, the Delegation expects that appraisals, evaluations 
and audits in  the  health, education and trade sectors will in future be undertaken jointly 
with  Member  States,  wherever  possible.  This  could  attenuate  Delegation  staffing 
constraints by complementing the Delegation's expertise with that of Member States. 
Figure 3 
~--~--Perceptions  of ~C Policy Dialogue and Aid Management in Zlmbabw e 
(n=1 0) 
HIGH 
/
!MODERATE I  \ 
....._LO  W___.l \ 
_  •  .-~--r,  ----,!----~----~~-----,+---.-----~----,-------,----~\ 
NIP  Involvement  11111 1
,---......_..~....,.~- .....  ~=- .....  ··,tlWz:::~rll 
~~---:!'-ill/E.,'  ~  Scope of  dialogue (projects)  liliil'~"  "--.....&r.:~IU....d~I...JiriF 
Scope of dialogue (policy)  liill~__...:.~=+·"'··  .......  ~ .. <~<_.'U'-...,.';_..<'....aS..IE.•·"'....,._I:ll 
:  I 
0,0  0,2  0.4  0,6  0,8  1,0  1,2  1,4  1,6  1,8  2,0 
IDC - August 1998  16 The Strategy 
Paper has 
strengthened 
programming 
Extensive 
consultations 
Chapter ill  Policy Dialogue 
CHAPTER III.  POLICY DIALOGUE 
A.  Indicative Programming 
Key Features 
The last two National Indicative Programming documents for EDF 8 and EDF 7  were 
signed in November 1996 and  1990 respectively. The focal  sector for NIP 7 was agri-
rural development. The focal  sectors were expanded to  include health and education in 
the last programming exercise.  The introduction of the Strategy Paper has strengthened 
the  programming  analysis,  particularly  by  identifying  programme  constraints  and  the 
donors  active  in  the  focal  sectors.  The  Strategy  Paper replaces a  less  analytical  Pre-
Programming Document. 
The Delegation took a strong lead in  the preparation of the Strategy Paper and the NIP 
(EDF 8).  The process was carefully planned and its deadlines were mostly fulfilled.  The 
Delegation  began  the  process  by  preparing  detailed  comments  to  the  paper  on 
Programming of the EDF 8 (January 1995).  The Delegation also carried out a review of 
previous aid delivery  mechanisms  in  the  context of Project Cycle Management.  The 
Strategy  Paper  was  subject  to  extensive  consultations  within  Headquarters,  including 
discussions in  the Comite de Suivi and the EDF Committee.  The Delegation also spent 
considerable time  discussing it  with  in-country  representations of the Member States. 
The Strategy Paper was finalised in March 1996 and discussed by the EDF Committee in 
May 1996. 
The Strategy  Paper was  a  key  input  to  the  Indicative  Programming exercise.  Initial 
discussions with the Government on the NIP focal areas began in April 1996.  The NIP 
mandate  for  negotiation  and  the  model  document  were  available  two  months  later. 
Zimbabwe was allocated  110 Mecu and discussions with the Government and Member 
States began.  The Delegation noted that both the Government and the Member States 
were in  favour of a sector-wide approach.  The discussions on the NIP draft involved 
meetings with all the Permanent Secretaries of the focal and non-focal sectors, while the 
line ministries contributed to revising and re-drafting the NIP. 
In  October  1996,  the  draft  NIP was  discussed by  the  Comite de  Suivi.  The Comite 
endorsed the  document but  was  cautious  on  the  sector wide  approach.  It  noted  that 
budgetary  support  would  not  be  available  if Zimbabwe  remains  "off-track"  in  the 
structural adjustment programme and  even if the country is  "on-track" in  principle no 
more than 10':0  '-;the NIP should become availabk for SASP.  The Comi[e ruso  noted 
that the  NIP's sector approach analysis on education and health was not as  detailed as 
that in agriculture.  The NIP was signed in November 1996.  Discussion on the Strategy 
Paper and the NIP on the complementarity and coherence with other EC instruments was 
limited.  However,  the  consultations  with  Government  and  Member States  on  these 
documents were more extensive than that for EDF 7 programming. 
The  Delegation  found  the  Strategy  Paper  and  the  NIP  a  very  useful  exercise.  The 
process  was  carried  out  by  Delegation  staff (and  not  by  consultants)  and  was  very 
demanding.  However, the involvement of Delegation staff contributed to effective donor 
consultations  and  facilitated  progress  in  the  broader  policy  dialogue  with  the 
Government (e.g.  on the benefits of a programme approach).  The Delegation believes 
that coordination in  programming (as well as  in  programme implementation) would be 
significantly enhanced if Member States were to provide more regular feedback on their 
own operations. 
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The  Government  appreciates  its  increased  participation  in  the  EDF  programming 
exercise. However, this process is very time consuming because it is done by each donor 
individually  (in  an  annual  or biannual  basis)  and  is  not  integrated into  the  budgetary 
process.  While the Ministry of Finance believes to  be fmnly in  control of the aid co-
ordination  process,  donors'  programming  puts  civil  service  staff under  considerable 
pressure.  The  Government  appreciates  the  advantages  of  the  programme  approach 
predicated in  the  NIP.  However, officials are conscious of the risk of different donors 
sending teams of consultants to  carry out parallel reviews of the same sectors.  These 
risks  are  compounded by  donor sector reviews  using civil  servants as  consultants for 
these reviews.  This can also weaken an already over-stretched civil service. 
Member States were appreciative of the Strategy Paper and NIP consultations.  Most MS 
noted  that  this  process  helped  to  enhance  donor  co-ordination  in  the  focal  sectors. 
However, donors also noted that this was only a consultative exercise and more should 
be done to encourage joint programming and appraisal operations.  Joint programming 
could reduce the  pressure  on  the  aid co-ordination  unit and on  line  ministries.  Most 
donors believe that the aid co-ordination unit has a workload beyond its capacity. 
Evaluation 
The Strategy Paper and the NIP have strengthened the programming process and have 
been produced through extensive consultations with the Government, Headquarters and 
Member States.  In  the  programming exercise, education and health  were identified as 
additional  focal  sectors.  While  this  was  justified  given  the  failure  of the  Social 
Dimensions of Adjustment Programme, the Delegation realises that these interventions 
are outside their own traditional areas  of expertise,  and  are  areas  in  which  they have 
particular capacity constraints
14
•  The Delegation and Geographical Unit agree that due 
to pressures from many sides, the NIP is not as focused as one might wish. 
B.  Structural Adjustment 
Key Features 
In  the  last  five  years  the  policy  dialogue  between  the  Government  and  the  Bretton 
Woods  Institutions  has  focused  on  macroeconomic  stabilisation,  trade  liberalisation, 
domestic deregulation and the Social Dimensions of Adjustment programme.  Initially, 
the  Government  appears  to  have  been  very  committed  to  the  reform  programme
15
. 
Recently land reform issues have also entered this policy dialogue. 
Trade liberalisation and domestic deregulation have progressed well, but the outcome of 
fiscal  refo~.m  c..Hd  the  Social  Dimensions  of  Adjustment  programme  have  been 
disappointing.  Budget deficits  have  contributed  to  high  real  interest rates  and  loss  of 
external  competitiveness.  The  Government  has  had  expenditure  pressures  from  civil 
service  wages,  war  veteran  pensions  and  the  drought  consequences.  Budget  cuts  in 
social services and health and education fees  have hit  poorer households harder,  while 
the Social Dimensions of Adjustment programme has been largely ineffective.
16
• 
17 
14  This partly explains the delays in  implementing the  timetable for social sector reviews and operations 
(Annex 4,  NIP). 
15  See  recent  ESAF evaluation  Repon of the  Group  of Independent  Persons Appointed to  Conduct an 
Evaluation of Certain Aspects of  the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility,  K.  Botchwey,  P.  Collier,  J. 
Gunning and K,  Hamada, 1998). 
16  Comments  on  the  impact of structural  adjustment on  the  social  sectors  refer  to  general  adjustment 
programmes and not specifically to those of  the EC. 
17 Perfonnance Audit Repon, August 1995.  World Bank. OED.  See also the recent "External Evaluation of 
the ESAF", IMF, April 1998. Collier,  P.,  Gunning, J,  et al.  It includes Zimbabwe as one of  the country cases. 
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Policy  dialogue  on  stabilisation  and  structural  reforms  was  carried  out  by  the 
headquarters  missions  of the  BWI.  The  negotiation  position  of  the  Government  is 
strengthened  by  its  relatively  low  dependence  on  foreign  aid  and  its  strong  (and 
relatively  well  paid)  civil  service
18
.  However,  the  quality  of the  civil  service  has 
deteriorated during the reform period
19  and some donors even contract civil servants as 
consultants. 
The macroeconomic dialogue is  carried out mainly by the Th1F.  The EC has  not been 
directly  involved  in  this  dialogue  but  it  has  been  very  effective  in  monitoring  all 
macroeconomic and reform developments.  This has been done even though Delegation 
advisers are overloaded by administrative work and also have to follow other sectors. 
The EC Structural Adjustment Support Programme (SASP) objectives were to  support 
the  overall structural adjustment reform programme, and to  influence the  allocation of 
resources to  the  education and  health sector, and to target the poorest segments of the 
population.  This was to be achieved by the EC involvement in budgetary discussions in 
the social sectors and through its participation in the Public Expenditure Review process. 
The  SASP  was  linked  to  the  ESAF and  these  conditionalities  have  been  effectively 
monitored.  However, there has been less analysis and monitoring on sectoral reforms in 
the social sectors. 
The budget support of the SASPl and SASP2 (counterpart funds)  were used to finance 
project activities in the education and health sectors and not to support broader budget 
lines as  had been agreed in  the  SASP2 implementation agreement.  This resulted in  a 
complex  implementation  over-stretching  the  capacity  of the  Delegation  to  carry  out 
strategic sector policy dialogue and to  participate in  social sector budgetary discussions 
(or  in  the  Public  Expenditure  Reviews).  As  a  consequence,  the  EC  has  not  had  a 
significant influence on the social sectors' policy dialogue. 
Co-ordination 
Given  the  limited  policy  dialogue  in  the  context  of SASP,  the  need  for  close  co-
ordination  with  the  BWI has  been  modest.  However,  the  Delegation  has  monitored 
ESAF discussions and  outcomes,  and  the  Policy Framework Paper, closely. The BWI 
have  shared  some  of this  information  with  the  EC,  particularly  through  their  local 
representatives.  One  weakness  in  this  collaboration,  is  the  fact  that  the  EC  has  not 
participated in  the WB  led PER exercises (1995 and  1996).  The economic monitoring 
carried-out by the Delegation is shared with the Member States. 
The interaction between the Delegation and Headquarters has  been effective.  While the 
Delegation  has  played  a  relatively  strong  role,  Headquarters  controls  most  strategic 
decisions. The Delegation has more flexibility in the use of the SASP counterpart funds. 
In some cases, the Delegation has been more inclined to relax SASP conditionalities or 
to justify Government's fiscal difficulties than Headquarters. 
The  Government  perceives  itself  in  control  of the  reform  agenda  and  takes  strong 
positions in its dialogue with the BWI.  It also believes that it is firmly in control of the 
aid  co-ordination  process.  Until  now,  the  Government has  not had  a  separate policy 
dialogue  with  the  EC  on  economic  reform  issues.  However,  it  has  recently  shown 
18  See civil service classification on  Decade of Civil Service Reform in  Sub-Saharan Africa,  IMF Working 
Paper 179,  1997. 
19  " ... budget cutting appears to have been an end in itself .. this has resulted in few efficiency gains and has 
encouraged  the  exodus  of key  civil  servants,  already  disgruntled  with  severe  salary  compression", 
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willingness  to  initiate  this  dialogue.  It  perceives  the  EC  as  a  relatively  neutral 
development partner that is prepared to listen. 
The  BWI  mentioned  their  difficulties  in  carrying  out  policy  dialogue  with  the 
Government  and  in  overcoming  its  reluctance  to  accept  TA.  The  BWI  also  faced 
difficulties  in  persuading  the  Government  to  change  its  policies  on  civil  service 
remuneration  or  land  reform.  The  BWI  appreciate  the  quality  of the  Delegation's 
economic monitoring and they effectively share information with the Delegation.  Their 
local representations seem favourable  to  the idea that the EC could play a more active 
role in the economic policy dialogue. 
Some Member States are  somewhat concerned about the credibility of the  BWI.  The 
BWI have often held over-optimistic assumptions regarding the Government's economic 
performance.  For example, donors mentioned that during the last Consultative Group, 
March  1995,  the  BWI supported the  Government's fiscal  stand only to  suspend their 
programmes few  weeks later.  Similarly, they consider that the current ESAF proposals 
(February  1998) are too dependent on  optimistic assumptions (wage containment, large 
privatisation receipts, etc.) 
Member States value the quality of the Delegation's economic monitoring and its good 
relations with the Government. Some are concerned by the restricted donor participation 
in  the  World  Bank  led  Public  Expenditure  Reviews.  Given  these  concerns,  most 
Member States  appear  to  support  a  greater  role  for  the  EC  in  the  economic  policy 
dialogue.  In  December  1997,  some MS  in-country  representations expressed concern 
that SASP2 funds  were disbursed without prior consultation.  The EC replied that the 
disbursement had been co-ordinated with  the  BWI,  it  had  followed  agreed procedures 
and that it had notified the Member States. 
Evaluation 
The two SASPs represent about 40 percent of total  commitments to  Zimbabwe under 
EDF 7.  The SASP is  an  aid instrument that is  dependent on  close monitoring of the 
economic environment.  Despite the high quality of the EC'  s economic monitoring, its 
policy dialogue on structural and social  sector reform has  been limited.  This outcome 
can be attributed to  the demanding implementation modality of the  SASP (support to 
projects),  to  the  advisers'  excessive  administrative  workload  and  to  the  difficulty  of 
engaging  the  Government  in  sensitive  policy  dialogue
20
.  However,  recently  the 
Delegation  has  initiated a dialogue  with  the  Government  on  improving the budgetary 
process in the social sectors. 
D.  Sector Policy Dialogue: Agriculture and Trade 
Key Features. 
The interventionist approach of the  1980's saw a more interventionist approach, set out 
in  documents such as the Transitional National Development Plan and First Five  Year 
Development Plan  (1986  - 1990), gave way in  the  1990's to  a  more consultative and 
flexible policy process. 
20 As noted in the SASP Evaluation,  "Further involvement in policy development and systemic improvements 
were probably not feasible,  in the sense that the EU and the government were not in a position to engage in 
the sectoral policy issues". 
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Box 1 - Three Examples of Approaches to Policy Dialogue in Project Preparation 
Top-level 
Zimbabwe seems to be characterised by a hierarchical decision-making process.  One approach in 
sector policy dialogue is to conduct it at the top level.  While this approach is not always feasible, 
it  can  be  very  effective.  An  example  of this  approach  is  the  preparation  of the  Minefield 
Clearance  Project.  The  need  for  the  project  was  raised  in  a  letter  from  the  developme-nt 
Commissioner  to the President "illustrating the Commission's proposal to allocate additional NIP 
resources for mine clearance activities"
21
•  It  took less than four months from this letter to the 
signing of the financing agreement for the project.
22 
Use of Conditionalities 
Another approach. is to negotiate changes in sector policies as pre-conditions for the approval of 
particular projects.  In the case of  funding of projects, this can take time since project funding has 
less leverage than programme support.  For example, in the Animal Disease Control Project the 
EC requested  the  introduction of diagnosis  and  dipping  fees  to  recover part of the  costs of 
veterinary services provided by the State.  However, there was strong resistance by the Ministry 
of Land and the financing agreement was not signed until the issue was properly addressed. The 
Government introduced these fees after 18 months of  discussions. 
Persuasion 
A more participatory approach of  policy dialogue is to openly discuss issues and agree on the best 
way forward based only on the strength of each other's ideas.  This is closest to the concept of 
partnership but can be very time consuming.  For example, the Government has been sceptical 
towards decentralised co-operation, where responsibility for aid management  is delegated to non-
state  actors.  The  Government maintained  that "individual  projects  must reflect Government 
policies  and  priorities" 
23
•  In  this  case,  it  took  over  three  years  of discussions  for  the 
Government to agree  to  allocate  5  Mecu to  decentralised co--operation  (from NIP).
24  During 
discussions, the Deputy NAO went to Namibia to see what decentralised co-operation meant in 
practice and the visit was critical in reassuring some of the Ministry's concerns. 
The Economic  Structural  Adjustment  Progranune  (ESAP),  signed  in  1991, contained 
elements  for  the  reform  of the  agriculture  sector.  These Included  the  deregulation  of 
agricultural  markets,  privatisation  of commercial activities  in  the  public  sector,  and a 
review  of the  delivery  and  funding  of technical  services.  Recognising  the  need  to 
articulate an  appropriate sector policy linked to  the  macroeconomic reform process, in 
1994 the Government set about preparing the Zimbabwe Agricultural Policy Framework 
(Z4PF) 1995- 2020. The preparatory work was led by the Ministry of Agriculture, who 
was  determined  to  involve  all  stakeholders  in  the  sector.  This  required  further  sub-
sectoral meetings. The ZAPF was approved by Cabinet in April 1996. 
Donors wanted to  move towards an Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP). 
However,  there  was  agreement,  including within the  Ministry  of Agriculture,  that  the 
pre-conditions  for  sector programme  were  not  yet  in  place.  Instead,  the  Agricultural 
Services and Management Project (ASMP) was proposed: 
"to put in place improved institutional arrangements and operational capacity 
for  policy  formulation  and for  the  sustainable  and  efficient  management, 
financing, and delivery of  agricultural services in Zimbabwe. "
25 
21  Minutes of  the EC-NAO meeting of21/6/95. 
22  However, it took  more than two years to bring the project to the tender stage. 
23 Minutes of  the EC-NAO meeting of  312194. 
24 No financing proposal on decentralised cooperation has been prepared as yet. 
25  Draft Aide-Memoire, Appraisal Mission, September 1997. 
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Evaluation of  Sector Dialogue 
The sector dialogue between the EC and the Government appears to be very effective in 
the  context  of the  preparation  of the  institutional  reform  of the  sector  (Agriculture 
Services  and  Management Project).  Policy dialogue  and donor co-ordination in  other 
sectors  (sector  approach  in  education  and  health,  ZimTrade)  is  more  limited  due  to 
limited manpower resources. 
Donors noted that sector dialogue often depends on  the capacity of the Ministry's top 
managers.  The successes in agriculture are for example due to:  (a) a strong management 
team there which knows how to  use technical assistance and when to  say no to donors; 
and (b)  good quality of Agricultural Advisers in  the  Delegation.  Problems in  trade or 
other  sectors  are  due  to  capacity  constraints  in  these  Ministries  as  well  as  in  the 
Delegation. In  the context of sectoral policy dialogue, it  is  difficult to obtain the correct 
balance between (a) increasing beneficiaries ownership by allowing them to prepare the 
project at their own speed (and capacity); and (b) keeping to donor timetables for project 
preparation. 
E.  Incorporation of Poverty, Gender, Environment and Governance issues 
Issues of poverty, gender, environment and governance are not just key policy objectives 
but are central to the effectiveness of aid.  According to the most recent NIP, "the overall 
objective  pursued  through  co-operation  under  this  Indicative  Programme  is  poverty 
alleviation through sustainable development".  A  recent evaluation study concludes 
that the,  "analysis of the determinants of project success shows that both government 
credibility  and  freedom  from  corruption  are  positively  related  to  project  outcome."
29 
Similarly, "projects with gender-related actions achieved their overall objectives - that 
is, received a satisfactory outcome rating - in relatively greater proportion than projects 
similar in sector and year of approval but without gender actions. "
30 
The Delegation Advisers appear well aware of the need to  incorporate poverty, gender, 
environment and governance issues into their interventions. They are familiar with many 
of the guidelines produced in Headquarters. These issues are also often discussed in the 
regular operational meetings between the Delegation and the NAO.  The Government is 
also often keenly aware of the importance of these issues, particularly of land reform as a 
way  to  address  poverty  issues
31
.  However,  the  Government's  capacity  and  the 
Delegation's  overload  of  administrative  work  and  new  policy  initiatives  (e.g. 
"Information Society") limit the ability of the EC to  incorporate these issues in  the aid 
programme.  This is a problem shared with most donors in Zimbabwe. 
A forthcoming study
32  indicates that, with the partial exception of Sweden, donors could 
not be said to have given the poverty reduction objective much consistent priority.  Most 
had  tried to  improve the  well-being of poor groups  with  specific  interventions but the 
poverty  reduction  content  of their  programmes  was  quite  limited.  Moreover,  in  their 
operations, donors were not applying the best practice in poverty reduction issues. Some 
donors  explicitly  recognised  that  in  practice  they  were  not  given  priority  to  poverty 
reduction in their aid to  Zimbabwe. In this context, a systematic review on how poverty, 
gender. environment and governance issues are incorporated in EC programmes would 
probably be beneficial (similar to DtiD's reviews of World Bank documents). 
29  OED,  The  Annual Review of Development  Effectiveness  (ARDE),  November  1997,  The  World  Bank, 
Washington DC. 
30  OED,  Mainstreaming  Gender  in  World  Bank  Lending:  An  Update,  March  1997,  The  World  Bank, 
Washington DC. 
31  Although the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan has not been implemented by Government. 
32  Killick,  Carlsson and Kierkegaard "European Aid and the Reduction of  Poverty in Zimbabwe: Denmark, 
Gennany, Netherlands, Sweden,  UK and the EC". 
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Apart  from  specific  relief  programmes,  agricultural  projects  have  not  contained  an 
explicit  focus  on  issues  of  poverty,  gender  or  the  environment,  but  the  issues  are 
nevertheless  often  addressed  by  these  projects.  For  example,  elaborate  targeting 
procedures  for  women  in  the  agricultural  sector have not  been considered necessary, 
based on the assumption that most farmers  are women.  Poverty reduction is  generally 
addressed by the promotion of economic growth.  EC interventions have focused on how 
best to achieve that growth, whether through key investments in agricultural production 
(during the  1980s), or by  improving the environment for commercial activities to draw 
subsistence  farmers  into  the  .economy  (during  the  1990s).  However,  given  the 
disappointing social outcomes of the structural adjustment programme it is possible that 
this approach will change and targeting services to the poor will become more common. 
The  World  Bank  and  UNDP  have  recently  been  involved  in  supporting  NGOs  that 
facilitate policy dialogue and monitoring of poverty issues; in particularly they supported 
the  "Poverty  Reduction  Forum"  based  in  the  University  of Zimbabwe's  Institute  of 
Development Studies.  However, donor participation in this forum has been limited until 
now. 
The  successful  approach  followed  by  the  EC'  s  Micro-Projects  Programme  in 
addressing poverty in Zimbabwe is different. A member of our team visited the Rutope 
Rural Health Centre.  The project involved the construction of a new clinic and 3 staff 
houses. The construction had finished on schedule. The project appears to be an excellent 
example  of community  participation,  involving  32  villages  and  5  commercial  farms. 
Each  village  contributed  bricks  and  labour,  while  the  farms  contributed  bricks  and 
transport
33
.  Donors recognise the quality of this EC intervention and have often noted 
their willingness to co-finance projects of this type. The Micro-Projects Programme uses 
explicit poverty criteria to guide the selection of projects. It  involves direct contact with 
civil society and NGOs.  In addition to the criteria given by Article 252 of Lome IV, the 
projects must, inter alia, "in the main benefit the poor and vulnerable groups in society, 
.  all  " '
4  espec1  y women  .  · 
On Governance issues, the EC has used the flexibility allowed by budget lines to finance 
the  LG?al  Resources Foun.dation,  one of the  two authors  of the Breaking the  Silence 
report
3 
.  The  EC  has  also  supported  the  Fight  Against  Corruption,  through  the 
organisation Transparency International.  Budget line financing seems to be better suited 
to  pursue delicate issues  like democracy and human rights as  they do not require the 
approval of the Government. 
Budget  lines  l)avp  11so  been  used  for  financing  projects  addressing  gender  and 
environmental  concerns.  Financing  for  a  large  credit  scheme  (the  Dondolo  Credit 
Scheme)  has  been  secured  through  the  Women  in  Development budget  line.  Other 
projects  targeting women have been fmanced through  the  NGO budget line.  Several 
environmental projects have been financed through the environment and tropical forest 
budget lines.  However, the  large number of projects financed through budget lines in 
Zimbabwe  complicates  their  management  and  over-stretches  the  capacity  of  the 
Delegation. 
33  However,  the  sustainability  of the  project  depends  on  the  provision  of medical  supplies  by  the 
Government.  This  is  now beginning to  be addressed.  The  Microprojects Programme now finances basic 
equipment such as beds. 
34  Background Paper,  National Management Unit,  March 1988. 
35  In  1997,  this  report  unveiled  extra-judicial  executions  and  disappearances  committed by  Government 
forces between 1980 and 1988. 
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F.  Assessment of EC Policy Dialogue 
As  described  previously,  the  orientation  of the  EC  aid  programme,  as  evidenced  by 
successive NIPs, has evolved in response to Government policies.  The policy dialogue 
on the Indicative Programme has contributed to the Government greater awareness of the 
importance of a sector approach and of improvements in the budgetary process. 
The EC has not been directly involved in  the macroeconomic dialogue but it  has  been 
very  effective  in  monitoring  macroeconomic  and  reform  developments.  The  SASP 
counterpart  funds  were  used  to  target  support  project  activities  with  over-complex 
implementation and monitoring arrangements. This has over-stretched the capacity of the 
Delegation  to  carry  out  strategic  policy dialogue  in  the  social  sectors,  particularly in 
supporting budget improvements. 
Sector  policy  dialogue  in  the  agriculture  sector  has  been  quite  successful  recently 
(ASMP)  but  more  limited  in  trade  promotion.  If  the  ASMP  proves  successful  in 
supporting institutional building in  the agriculture sector, a sector-wide approach might 
become feasible. 
In  general,  policy  dialogue  is  stronger  during  project  preparation  than  during 
implementation. There has  been also some weakness in  modifying ongoing projects in 
the light of policy changes.  In a recent evaluation of rural sector projects, all projects 
scored  highly  for  the  relevance  of  project  purpose  to  the  Government  policy. 
Nevertheless, the study found that "in the absence of routine monitoring and assessment, 
proj~~ts ~ere not  mo~ified in  the .~i~ 6
ht of a  Governm~nt.  strate~ ~h~ge to  includ~ the 
participatiOn of the ·pnvate sector.  However, the hffilted partiCipatiOn of the pnvate 
sector may also be explained by the Government's ambiguous commitment to its policies 
towards the private sector. 
36  Agrisystems  (Overseas)  Ltd,  Evaluation  of Rural  Sector  Projects,  November  1997.  The  evaluation 
covered 18 separate interventions constituting the bulk of  EU-funded support to the agricultural and rural 
sector dunng 1986-1996. 
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CHAPTER IV.  AID Il\lPLEl\IENTATION AND MANAGEMENT 
A. The Instruments 
As  shown  in  Figure  -'·  Stabex  and  SASP funds  have  risen  in  importance  since  1993, 
after Zimbabwe embarkl'd on  a Structural Adjustment Programme supported by  the IMF. 
the \Vorld  Bank. the  EC and other donors in  1991. 
Fi!!urt~-'- Pavments h\' Instrument 1EOF 5-71 
· D SAF  .  ~··· ~~+~·--~--+---~.  J1.~1~~j_-·-~--·~ 
•  Stabex  :  ---~L. -----~--·~  __ _]__  20 7  l18~_: 
•  Stabex  o SAF  •  Others  •  NIP: 
As shov, n in  Figure -'  and Table 6.  EDF 7 marked a shift from  project to  programme aid 
(  SASP and  Stabex ).  However.  NIP aid  has also increased steadily.  Within  project aid. 
resources have shifted from  agriculture towards the  social sectors and trade development. 
EIB  contributions have also been an  important feature  in  both EDF 6 and  7.  OveralL the 
EC has  provided  8(} of all  official development assistance received by  Zimbabwe since 
independence. 
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Table 6  - EC Assistance to Zimbabwe under EDF 6, 7 and 8 
-- EDF6  EDF-7 11  EDFB3/ · 
·sector  MECU  %  MECU  %  'MECU  % 
Health  10.2  1  0.4°h  6.3  2.8°h  5.0  4.5o/c 
Education  4.5  4.6°h  - 0.0°h  3.8  3.4o/c 
Environment  - 0.0°h  0.3  0.1o/c  - O.Oo/c 
Agriculture
31  59.3  60.6°h  50.7  22.8o/c  15.0  13.6°/c 
Structural Adjustment/Stabex  - 0.0°h  99.1  44.6%  66.0  60.0o/c 
Tradeffourism  9.6  9.8o/c  10.7  4.8°h  12.0  1  0.9°/c 
EIB Risk Capital and Interest Relief  11.1  11.4o/c  39.6  17.8o/c  - 0.0°h 
Emergency/Refugees  1.3  1.3°h  2.4  1.1 o/c  - O.Oo/c 
Other  1.8  1.9o/c  12.9  5.8°h  8.3  7.5°h 
Total  97.9  1  00.0°/c  222.1  1  00.0°/c  110.0  100.0°/c 
of which: 
Programmable Regional  8.1  8.3°h  17.1  7.7°h  n/a 
Non-oroarammable  12.9  13.2o/c  113.5  51.1 o/c  nla 
Source: OLAS and NIP 1996-2000 
1/  Excluding the transfer from EDFS 
2J Scenario A:  on-track IMF. Excludes regional resources 
31 No information available on sectoral distribution of micro-projects.  We allocated the entire amount to agriculture. 
Note: The sectoral allocation in  this  table has been prepared by the consultants using project information 
from the On-Line Accounting System (for EDF 6 and 7).  Structural adjustment and Stabex are included as 
sectors  for  presentational  purposes  - it  is  not  always  possible  to  allocate  these  resources  to  sectors  (see 
Understanding European Community Aid, ODI 1997). 
B.  Institutional Arrangements 
Overall  co-ordination of EC  aid  is  carried  out  by  the  National  Authorising Officer's 
office as  described in  Chapter I.  The monthly meeting with the NAO office is  a very 
important instrument used by the Delegation in  monitoring project implementation. The 
meeting is  attended by Delegation advisors and NPOs, by the NAO Office staff, and by 
line Ministries and implementing agencies involved in managing EC aid.  As a result, all 
parties  responsible  for project  implementation are  gathered around  a  table and delays 
where several parties are involved can be understood, and often solved, at the meeting. 
At  the  project level,  institutional arrangements for project implementation are of three 
types: fully integrated, parastatal and parallel management structures. 
Several projects are  implemented by  Government departments.  SASP and Stabex are 
monitored by  the NAO office which  is  part of the Ministry of Finance (although with 
support  of Technical  Assistance).  The  integration  of SASP  implementation  within 
Government's  structures  is  a  very  positive  feature.  However,  the  targeting  of SASP 
counterpart  funds  in  specific  projects  involves  complex  ad-hoc  implementation  and 
monitoring arrangements. This  is  extremely  time-consuming and sometimes  interferes 
with Government procedures, for example T A "audits" in Ministry of Education. In the 
case of agriculture, the Ministry has been arguing against the creation of a separate unit 
to  manage  ASMP  and  believes  that  the  ASMP  implementation  should  be  the 
responsibility of the Ministry itself.  The EC has supported this Government position. 
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A  second  approach,  rare  today,  is  project  implementation  through  parastatals  which 
might  have  been  created  during  project  design  but  whose  purpose  was  not  just the 
implementation  of  the  project.  This  was  the  case  for  the  Agricultural  and  Rural 
Development  Authority  (ARDA) 
37
,  which  was  the  implementing  agency  of several 
agricultural projects and of the  Micro-Projects Programme till a few  years ago.  In  the 
case  of trade  development,  the  project  was  implemented  by  ZimTrade,  a  parastatal 
created when the project was  being prepared, based on  recommendations from studies 
financed by a previous project. 
A third modality is a Project Management Unit <PMU), staffed by consultants and whose 
sole function is  to  manage a project.  This has become the most popular approach.  The 
Micro-Projects  Programme  is  being  implemented  by  a  National  Management  Unit 
(NMU) staffed with  15  consultants.  There have been discussions on the possibility of 
creating a similar unit to assist the NAO office in carrying out its functions. 
Institutional  studies  indicate  that  the  first  implementation  arrangement  is  the  most 
sustainable,  although  all  three  approaches  are  characterised  by  a  substantial  use  of 
technical assistance. 
Some  implementation  structures  are  complex.  For  example,  the  Micro-Projects 
Programme,  whose  performance  has  been  very  good,  has  a  complex  implementation 
structure that may  limit its  potential  scope.  Under the present set-up,  all  projects are 
submitted for approval to  an  Appraisal Committee (which meets quarterly and includes 
staff from the National Management Unit, the NAO office and the Delegation).  Similar 
programmes from other donors use community development funds,  where decisions are 
made  by  the  beneficiaries  through  existing  social  structures  (e.g.,  village  councils). 
Similarly, ZimTrade is  supposed to  provide assistance  to  exporters directly.  However, 
other donors use light touch interventions like matching grant schemes where the trade 
development organisation finances but does not carry out consulting assignments.  The 
latter  has  the  advantage  of supporting  the  local  consulting  industry  and  being  much 
easier to administer. 
38 
In some cases too  many units were involved in  the implementation of projects and this 
complexity  was  addressed  by  creating co-ordination units  or Steering Committees.  In 
agriculture  a  recent  evaluation
39  found  that,  mainly  due  to  hasty  preparation,  most 
projects  "were  over-complex  in  organisational  arrangements,  particularly  in  utilising 
several  implementing agencies  which  had  to  be  co-ordinated  by  a  temporary  project 
entity."  In the case of the Development Programme for the Communal Areas in Kariba 
District (DPCAK): 
"The managers were placed in a situation that was probably unworkable.  The 
individual Co-ordinators did not have former project management experience 
but H.:ere  not provided with  regular support from  either ARDA or TA.  Their 
brief was not detailed but,  as the job title  indicates,  hinged on  co-ordinating 
others.  Given the mandate without the authority and with only partial control 
over the  budget,  the  Co-ordinators  have  had to  operate  by  persuasion  and 
negotiation  rather than  instruction.  Management  by co-ordination  has  also 
proved vulnerable to the realities of  local politics." 
37 Although day-to-day implementation was delegated to semi-autonomous PMUs. 
38 The  EC is moving in  this direction in  Zimbabwe.  The  largest component in  the Ef1'  EDF draft financing 
proposal for trade is a matching grant scheme. 
39 Agrisystems (Overseas) Ltd., ibidem. 
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C.  Programme and Project Cycle Management 
Programme and Project Preparation 
In some of the sectors of our study, we noticed that project preparation can take very 
long and that project design is often not sufficiently flexible.  For example, the Small 
Scale Irrigation hogramme (SSIP) was designed in  1986, appraised in  1990 and started 
implementation in  1992 without major changes in design. In trade, the ZimTrade Support 
Programme was designed when exchange controls were prevalent but its design did not 
change when these controls were removed. 
In  many projects, there has been an adequate involvement of Government and local 
agencies,  even  when  the  initiative  to  prepare  a  project  usually  originates  in  the 
Delegation.  For example, the SSIP originated from a pre-appraisal study generated by 
the  ARDA Project Preparation Unit for  Manicaland,  while both  the  Mashonaland East 
Fruit and Vegetable Project (MEFVP) and the 8th Micro-Projects Programme followed 
formal evaluations of the previous phase. For Stabex 1992, the identification process was 
led by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It  involved extensive consultations with 
the  various  stakeholders  in  the  cotton  and  coffee  sub-sectors.  Involvement  of direct 
beneficiaries has  been  weaker, except in  the  case of the  Micro-Projects Programme (a 
quick-disbursing programme geared to direct requests by the community).  In the case of 
the SSIP, involvement of the beneficiaries (farmers) did take place, but only at the later 
stage of detailed design of the irrigation schemes. 
Projects  often  have  insufficiently  dear  implementation  modalities.  Financing 
agreements in agriculture often have insufficient details on inception and implementation 
modalities.  This can caused further delays once the project has started (up to two years) 
and  can  misuse  expensive  technical  assistance  when  deployed  before  logistical 
arrangements  are  in  place.  It  has  been  suggested  that  project  implementation  would 
benefit from  the  inclusion  of indicative  first  year  work  programmes  in  the  financing 
agreements  to  prevent delay (and possible  friction)  in  the  production and  approval of 
Annual Work Programmes and Budget Estimates. 
Project  preparation  often  overlooks  the  actual  implementation  and  monitoring 
capacity of both the Government and the Delegation. For example, the  targeting of 
SASP 1  to  nine  sub-programmes 
40  was  a  departure  from  both  a  general  programme 
approach  and  from  a  traditional  project approach.  It  was  believed  that  this  targeting 
would  facilitate  the  control  of counterpart  funds.  But  the  design  did  not  take  into 
account  the  limited  capacity  available  in  the  Government,  EC  Headquarters  and  the 
Delegation  to  monitor  this  approach.  SASP  2  was  designed  w  simplify  these 
arrangements  but  it  did  not  happen.  Its  design  overlooked  the  impact  of  new 
arrangements on the Government's budget procedures. 
In many cases, EDF committee discussions of financing proposals are too general.  In 
the case of SASP there was little discussion on programme risks and the nature of SASP 
implementation  modalities.  In  the  case  of  ZimTrade,  the  main  concern  was  the 
coherence of ZimTrade with the SASP programme and the need to include a mid term 
review  in  the  proposal.  In  these discussions  EC staff mostly focus  on obtaining the 
approval of the proposal, which often requires an optimistic assessment of future country 
40  Sub-programmes  included:  provision  of basic  materials for primary schools,  provision of basic  book 
storage  capacity  in  primary schools,  school  sanitation  programme,  basic needs  in  books for secondary 
schools, monitoring primary schools, upgrading primary and secondary school teachers, primary science kit 
programmes.  In health: medical stores working capital and water for health facilities.  Two  riders included 
two additional sub-programmes. Siakobu and Laboratory Technicians. 
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developments."H  For example,  in  June  1994  EC  staff presented  the  SASP2 financing 
proposal just after an  inconclusive ESAF-EFF review.  However, the EC staff argued 
strongly for  the  approval of the  financing  proposal.  In  these circumstances, the  EDF 
committee insisted on explicit commitments not to sign the financing agreement before 
the  budget presentation and to  interrupt the  programme based on the  next ESAF mid-
term review.  Soon after, the ESAF programme went off-track. 
In  many cases, Financing proposals contain insufficient details on  the programme 
rationale  and  implementation  plans  to  provide  an  adequate  basis  for  a  financing 
decision.  The  Agrisysterns  evaluation  also  notes  that  while  most  projects  underwent 
lengthy  preparation  periods  they  have  often  been  under-designed. The ZSP financing 
proposal  included  a  log-frame  that  was  somewhat  inadequate  for  monitoring  and 
evaluation purposes. 
Programme and Project Implementation 
As  with  most  donors,  EC  projects  have  suffered  from delays  in  implementation.  In 
agriculture, for example, the evaluation by Agrisystems found consistent problems with 
delays over the Annual Work Programme and Budget Estimates, and the recruitment of 
technical  assistance  personnel.  In  addition  to  the  lack  of  clear  implementation 
arrangements,  delays  are  attributed  to  the  inexperience  of  project  managers  in  the 
financial  and  reporting  procedures  of  the  EC.  A  general  observation  by  those 
interviewed was the complexity and time involved in complying with EC disbursement 
42  and procurement procedures. 
A  check of the  Small Scale Irrigation Programme (SSIP), Mashonaland East Fruit and 
Vegetable (MEFV) and ZimTrade Support, using the reference time limits set out in the 
detailed  evaluation  by  Price Waterhouse  in  1992 
43  (see  Table  7),  shows  that  these 
projects experienced delays  longer than  the  reference  limits.  In  one case (SSIP),  the 
project preparation time exceeded the maximum time recorded by the Price Waterhouse 
44  study  . 
41  This  is  in part because of the pressure of  administrative requirements for commitments,  whose deadlines 
must be complied with in order not to lose the fwuls. 
42  This caused particular frictions with the Agriculture and Rural Development Agency (ARDA),  used as the 
implementing agency in a number of  EU projects.  However,  capacity constraints within ARDA were also a 
contributing factor to such delays. 
43  «Study  of the  causes  of delay  in  the  implementation  of financial  and  technical  cooperation»,  Price 
Waterhouse,  1992 
44 Limits for awarding of  contracts in Price Waterhouse were already quite long. 
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Table 7 - Delays in Project Processing and Implementation: A Comparison with the 
Price Waterhouse Report 
Phase  Price Waterhouse Report:  Small  Scale  ZIMTRADE  Mashonaland 
Time Limifs (months)  Irrigation  Support  East Fruit an 
Programme  Vegetable 
Max.  value of 
delay recorded 
A.  Project  Preparation  6  18  24  12 
(preparation  of  financing 
proposal  to  s1grnng  of 
financing agreement) 
Drawing up financing proposal  2  6  13  7 
Approval of financing proposal  2  10  4  2 
Signing  financing agreement  2  3  7  3 
B. A  warding of contracts 
(preparation  of  dossier  to 
signing of contract) 
Works (Open IT)  20  46  19  -
Supply (Open In  13  39  - -
Service (Restricted m  8  33  14  9.5 
Excluding time for pre-
qualification 
The  EC  is  not  alone  in  experiencing  delays  in  implementation.  The  last  Country 
Portfolio Performance Review of the World Bank found that IDA projects had suffered 
from  delays  in  project  start-up  (up  to  two  years)~ procurement  (particularly  on  large 
contracts where decisions need to be vetted by the President's office), and in submission 
of financial audits due to  "a capacity issue both in  terms of accounting in implementing 
agencies and audit capacity at the Office of the Auditor General". 
Interviews  with  project  managers  revealed that close support from  Delegation staff 
made a significant difference to project administration.  Delegation staff could often 
help  to  speed  up  processes,  especially  where  they  had  good  informal  contacts  with 
Headquarters  (allowing  them  to  react  to  potential  problems  at  an  early  stage).  The 
involvement of technical ass.istance in project administration can also make a difference. 
In the case of SSIP,  the  project adviser provided substantial support on  administrative 
issues, preparation of financial statements, etc. 
At  the  same  time.  advisors  in  the  Delegation  ran  the  risk  of becoming  project 
managers or co-managers.  As noted in the Agrisystems evaluation 
45
: 
"Routine supervision of  a constructive nature  .... does not appear to have been 
a feature of the project portfolio.  For the  Delegation,  there appears to  have 
been  a fine  line  between  their unavoidable  responsibilities for financial and 
contractual  administration  related  to  projects  and  direct  involvement  in 
managerial and technical issues." 
45  Agrisystems (Overseas) Ltd., Evaluation of  Rural Sector Projects, October 1997 
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The involvement of the  Delegation  in  project management  may  be explained by  the 
weakness  of  some  implementing  agencies.  This  involvement  further  increases  the 
Delegation's already heavy workload. 
The  implementation  and  monitoring  of  EC  interventions  has  been  affected  by  the 
extensive nature of EC ex-ante financial controls. In this context, much less emphasis is 
given to monitoring project performance or to ex-post financial audits.  Also, financial 
audits  could be  particularly  useful  in  other EC  interventions,  such  as  the  counterpart 
funds  of SASP,  where  the  nature  of the  ex-ante  controls  is  generally  weaker.  We 
examined a  sample  of fourteen  EDF 7  projects  to  determine  what  share  of the  total 
amount disbursed as  of December 31,  1997 had  been subject to ex-post controls.  Our 
sample accounted for 58 per cent of the total EDF 7 disbursement to that date.  The result 
was  that  most  expenditures  are  sub}ect  to  ex-ante  controls 
46  but  only  21  percent of 
expenditures had been fully audited 
7
.  For example, the auditing of agriculture projects 
has  not  been  carried  out  consistently.  The  imprest  accounts  for  the  Micro-Projects 
Programmes are audited  quarterly; those of the MEFVP annually; and the SSIP not at 
all. In  the case of SASP, there has been extensive ad-hoc monitoring by theTAs but no 
external audit of counterpart funds  has  taken place.  Only SASP 1 had an operational 
review. 
Because of EC financial  arrangements  and  requirements from Member States, ex-ante 
controls are applied without selectivity.  This is extremely time consuming to Delegation 
staff, although in the case of Zimbabwe, the NAO and the Delegation have the support of 
the National Programmer Officers.  A change towards more selectivity in the application 
of these controls would save valuable EC staff time.  For example, EDF 6 and EDF 7 
required 480 procurement decisions
48
•  However, only a fourth  of this total number of 
procurement decisions. those above ecu 100,000, explained 84% of the total value.  As 
economies  of scale  in  procurement and  disbursement decisions  are  minimal,  a  move 
towards removing ex-ante controls for procurement decisions below ecu 100,000, while 
extending financial audits to all expenditures under EDF funded programmes would save 
considerable staff time. 
The efficiency cost of extensive ex-ante controls can also be  seen in the processing of 
payment  orders  for  every  expenditure.  Table 8  presents  a  very  simple  attempt  to 
estimate  the  staff  time  spent  processing  payment  orders:  1.5  person  year  at  the 
Delegation and  1 at the NAO office.  This excludes the time spent by Headquarters staff 
on  direct  payments.  In  this  context,  the  Delegation  Advisers  are  more  properly 
"Programme  Officers",  carrying  out  administrative  as  well  as  routine  project 
management tasks. 
46 Annual work plans still required notification of  each activity before it took place with the possibility of  an 
objection  by  the  EC,  while  the  advances for micro-projects  were  disbursed  only after approval of the 
Afpraisal Committee which included a technical adviser from the Delegation. 
4  As far as SASP or Stabe.x are concerned we did not consider an expenditure fully audited if only the forex 
part had been audited while the use of  counterpart funds had not. 
48  Delegated appropriations excluding Annual Work Programmes, advances on  microprojects,  Stabex,  EIB 
risk  capital and  interest  relief and  emergency assistance,  all of which  are  disbursed  in  one  tranche  or 
following accelerated procedures. 
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Table 8 - Processing of Payment Orders 
Item  1994  1995  1996  1997 
No.  of  payment  324  367  405  450 
orders  processed  by 
Delegation  (local 
and foreign) 
Person-days spent on  243  276  304  338 
POs 
49 bv Delegation 
Person-days spent on  162  183  202  225 
POs by NAO Office 
Person  Year  Spent  1.84  2.09  2.30  2.56 
on POs 
50 
The large volume of project records is  another indicator of the considerable work-load 
attached to each intervention.  A  good example of administrative burden is  the Micro-
Projects Programme whose records alone occupy an entire room of the EC Delegation's 
offices. 
The  extensive  administrative  burden  (which  is  in  part  a  result  of EDF  procedures 
determined by Member States) reduces the time available for the monitoring of project 
performance. In  project cycle management the quality of monitoring information and the 
way in  which it  is  translated into changes in design are key factors for success.  Many 
evaluations have noted the lack of relevant project information.  A  recent evaluation on 
agriculture concluded that they found a general absence of coherent monitoring. Another 
evaluation in  trade development found that "the formats used [for financial statement], 
even though  they  are  in  accordance with  EC rules,  are  not  quite clear.  It  would be 
preferable  to  make  annual  work  programmes  containing  the  contribution  of  all 
components.  . . .  What  seems  worrisome  is  that  elements  of  the  budget  are 
incomprehensible."
51  "ZSP produces annual and quarterly progress reports ... resulting 
in  little  or  no  feed-back,  so  the  Programme  proceeds  as  it  set  out  with  only  minor 
corrections to  its  direction."  A  lot of information on operational as  well as  financial 
issues  is  available but not  analysed.  In  this  context,  the evaluators recommended an 
annual monitoring. 
The  monitoring  of a  complex  programme  like  SASP  is  often  more  difficult.  The 
interaction between Headquarters and the Delegation has been generally good but there 
has  been  some  friction.  For  example,  in  some  cases  the  Delegation  is  more 
understanding than Headquarters of the Government missing ESAF conditionalities.  In 
April  1996  the  Delegation  supported  the  release  of SASP2  funds  but  this  was  not 
approved  by  Headquarters.  Similarly,  in  December  1996,  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
disbursement of funds  to  the Government, the Delegation proposed that the NIP funds 
included  in  SASP  2  should  be  de-committed.  However,  Headquarters  rejected  this 
proposal on the grounds that it would send the wrong signal on the need to control the 
fiscal deficit. 
The implementation of the SASP, as in other countries, has also faced difficulties in the 
way to include its counterpart funds in the Government budget. The attempt to simplify 
49 Assuming a  very  conservative  time  of six hours  to:  (a)  prepare the  PO and go  through  the  27 items 
contained in  the  checklist;  (b)  send to  Ministry of  Finance (NAO) and follow up;  (c)  give it for signing to 
Head of Delegation after the  adviser has checked it;  (d)  send the  original either to the  local bank or to 
headquarters in Brnssels.  We also assume that NAO office spends 4 hours on each  PO. 
50 Assuming 220 working days per year. 
51  Carl Bra Management,  Evaluation of  the Zimtrade Support Programme (ZSP) Zimbabwe, Aprill997, ~ 
Draft Final Report, p.  4.2. 
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the targeting of SASP2 funds was not approved by the Government and it has continued 
to  target projects  in  the  education and  health  sectors.  Furthermore,  in  many cases the 
non-predictability of SASP resources has affected the implementation of wider projects 
in  both  the  education  and  the  health  sector.  This  problem is  compounded because in 
many cases officials in  the social sectors are unaware that the SASP disbursements are 
conditional  to  the ESAF agreements.  However, the  Delegation  is  conscious of these 
implementation difficulties and has begun discussions to  move towards a more general 
budget support programme. 
Evaluation 
One of the strengths of EC managed aid is  the regularity of ex-post evaluations carried-
out  by  independent  evaluators  and  shared  with  Government  and  other  donors.  All 
sectors  of concentration  of this  study  had  been  evaluated  in  the  last  12  months.  EC 
officials in Headquarters and the Delegation were very appreciative of the importance of 
these  evaluations  in  learning  operational  lessons.  The evaluations  in  the  agricultural 
sector (Rural Sector Projects and Stabex) appear to be particularly useful in  operational 
terms.  However,  because  of administrative  constraints,  while  EC  staff  have  taken 
important steps to incorporate evaluation lessons in  the  design of new operations, this 
has been a difficult process. 
The SASP programmes were given a thorough evaluation by  a mission of the Court of 
Auditors,  report  published  in  February  1997.  The  EC  disagreed  with  some  of its 
analyses.  The  SASP  was  also  evaluated  by  external  consultants  (July  1997).  This 
evaluation analysed the reasons for the  Government's fiscal  policy being off track and 
concluded  that  it  did  not  provide  grounds  for  continued  non-disbursement  of SASP 
funds.  It also supported a programme approach to the SASP that would strengthen the 
policy dialogue in budgetary reform.  The evaluation was discussed both in Headquarters 
and the Delegation but there was limited feedback from the Government or other donors. 
There  was  agreement  on  the  need  of  a  more  flexible  programme  approach  but 
Headquarters did not agree with the  recommendation to resume SASP disbursements. 
Evaluations taken into account in  the design of new projects include:  (a) in  agriculture 
the focus of the 8th Micro-Projects Programme shifted from income generating activities 
to  community infrastructure based on  the  lessons  from  a  previous evaluation;  (b)  the 
Mashonaland East Fruit and Vegetable Projects included some of the recommendations 
of the evaluation of its first Phase. 
The  ZimTrade  Support  Programme  was  evaluated  in  April  1997.  However,  this 
evaluation  does  not  reach  clear  conclusions  on  the  efficiency  or  impa\t  of  this 
intervention. ThiS  is  partly because the programme did not include a monitoring system 
to  record  information  that  would  have  allowed  the  management  team  to  regularly 
monitor its  own results and allowed evaluators to  have information to carry out a cost-
benefit analysis. 
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D.  Management of Technical Assistance 
Technical assistance has assumed a growing importance in EC aid to Zimbabwe, raising 
by  a  third  between  EDF  6  and  7  (see  Figure 5).  It  accounted  for  a  fourth  of all 
programmable assistance 
52  to Zimbabwe under EDF 7.  This proportion of T A to total 
aid is in line with that of other donors assisting Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 6.  It is 
also highly concentrated as the five largest delegated appropriations for TA were equal to 
70% of the total. 
Figure 5 
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In  some cases, because of capacity constraints, the TA has been insufficiently managed 
by the Government (and the EC), both during project preparation and implementation. 
Project preparation can be too influenced by external consultants. While using external 
consultants  in  project  preparation  is  a  common  feature  of most  aid  programmes,  the 
influence of their work  on  the  final  product depends  on  the  management of both  the 
Government and  the  donor.  Other donors  manage consultants  more closely and  allow 
them a smaller role in  programme design. An interesting example of some of the issues 
that arise in the management of technical assistance is provided by the trade development 
support programme (Box 3). 
Box 3 - The Role of Consultants in the Preparation of ZimTrade Support 
Programme 
The only project prepared  in  trade  during  the  last five  years  has  been the ZimTrade Support 
Programme (ZSP). 
53  The project was  identified  in  1991  by  the consulting company that was 
implementing  its  predecessor  (ZEPP).  The  process  started  with  the  preparation  of a  draft 
financing proposal by the consultant, with limited input from Government or the Delegation.  The 
proposal, both in  its draft as  well as in  its  final form,  did not include cost-benefit analysis nor 
detailed implementation arrangements. 
The consulting company designed and negotiated the project with the EC Delegation.  The project 
(10.2 Mecu) included a TA contract of over 7  Mecu.  The project was  supply~driven at a time 
when best practice in  trade development was already pointing the advantages of demand-driven 
approaches.  Headquarters questioned whether the consultants who were implementing ZEPP and 
designing ZSP should be included in the shortlist for the implementation of ZSP.  The Delegation 
felt that their proven experience and competence were the key factors.  The official transmission 
of the financing proposal from the Delegation to Headquarters states:  'The proposals has been 
drawn  up  by  the  Delegation in  accordance  with the new format  submitted by DGVTII  and  in 
consultation with the consulting team under ZEPP." The project files contain very little evidence 
of  consultations with Government. 
The consulting team advised  the EC on the type of contract to  use  and  prepared  the project 
budget.  It then took part in the tender for the contract and eventually won it. 
The Structural Adjustment Support Programme use of short-term consultants probably 
contributed  to  the  relative  speed  of the  preparation  process.  However,  it  might  have 
weakened the link between SASP and other EC instruments and the under-estimation of 
EC  staffing constraints. The limited Government or EC management of TA also partly 
explains that the quality of sectoral reports or the nature of the implementation modality 
can often depend on the quality/skills of the consultants.  For example, under SASP I, the 
education sector component is  reported to  have been better analysed and justified than 
that of the health sector
54
. 
The  limited  resources  available  for  SASP  formulation,  the  reliance  on  short-term 
consultants  and  insufficient analysis  for  financing  and  implementation documents has 
contributed to some implementation bottlenecks. Given EC staffing constraints, the TA 
plays a key role in implementation and monitoring (even "auditing") of a very complex 
SASP.  The monitoring of SASP counterpart funds is based on ad-hoc systems designed 
and  implemented  by  the  programme  T As.  The  T A  assists  in  the  identification  of 
projects,  carries  out  physical monitoring (visits  around  the country
55
)  and the  sample 
52  Measured as the total delegated appropriations as of  December 31,  1997.  Our calculations were based 
on the entries in the Ol.AS system. 
53 A new project is currently under preparation. 
54  See SASP Evaluation Report (July 1997), page 9. 
55 Several hundreds of  schools are part of  the sub-programmes. 
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testing of reimbursement invoices. TA also monitors counterpart funds accounts.  Until 
now,  these activities  have not properly supported Government structures and in some 
cases  they  may undermine them.  For example,  Government officials  pointed out that 
support to normal Government monitoring and auditing of projects in the social sectors 
would probably be more efficient than ad-hoc monitoring.  Similarly, the monitoring of 
expenditures in support of ex-soldiers retrenchment in the Ministry of Defence also faced 
some  difficulties.  The Delegation is  aware  of these  problems and has  been recently 
trying to use the T A resources to strengthen the policy dialogue in sector budget reforms. 
Finally, in  agriculture, the recent external comprehensive evaluation of the sector
56 notes 
that "the files are filled with accounts of poor TA performance, inadequate reporting, and 
lack of consideration of counterpart training requirements.  T A recruited through body-
shop-type consulting companies usually provides little continuity of purpose, methods 
and  techniques.  As  a  result,  projects  that  rely  on  imported  TA are  probably  more 
exposed to  the risk of failure".  At the same time, it  is  important to recognise that some 
TA in the sector appears to have integrated well into the host institution (e.g. Small Scale 
Irrigation Programme). 
E.  Assessment of EC Aid Implementation and Management Performance 
The objective of Project Cycle Management, as stated in  the EC's Manual, is  to  "learn 
from past experience in  order to perform better in the future".  The institutional set-up of 
EC-managed aid and its  range of instruments and procedures have evolved over time, 
based on  experience.  The performance of EC aid implementations must therefore be 
assessed based on learning. 
As shown above, the main features of the present EC-ACP aid management set-up are: 
+  A centralised decision making structure,  where most decisions are made in Brussels; 
+  Ex ante controls (approvals) on most procurement and disbursement decisions (with 
a  few  exceptions  like  annual  work  programmes,  which  are  based  on  imprest 
accounts).  Most disbursements  require the  involvement of at  least  three  separate 
functions:  the 
authorising  officers 
(usually  the  Head  of 
Delegation  upon 
recommendation  from 
the responsible adviser 
- and  the  NAO);  the 
financial  controller 
and  the  accounting 
officer. 
As shown in Figure 7,  the 
centralised  model  is  not 
unique to  the  EC and it  is 
one  of  two  common 
approaches.  The 
alternative  is  a  more 
decentralised system based 
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Figure 7 - Decision Making by Selected Donors 
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on ex-post controls (e.g.,  financial  audits, operational audits,  spot checks/supervisions; 
imprest accounts). 
Centralised  systems  based  on  ex-ante  controls  have  three  major  weaknesses:  (a) 
decisions are made by staff far removed from reality on the field;  (b) they are slow to 
react~ and (c) widespread ex-ante controls are very time consuming, particularly for staff 
on the field (both on the Government's and the Delegation's side). 
At  present,  ex-ante  financial  controls  are  the  responsibility  of economic  or technical 
advisers  who  do  not usually  have  financial  or accounting skills.  Advisers  in  the  EC 
Delegation in  Zimbabwe spend up to three-fourths of their time on administrative tasks 
with little time left for dialogue and analysis. A recent European Parliament's report on 
EU Aid to Zimbabwe
57  concluded that: 
''On the one hand,  the EC development co-operation financial system may be 
said to  be efficient and fair because of stringent controls ensuring the correct 
implementation  of  the  Lome  Convention.  On  the  other  hand,  slow 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures contribute  to  slowing the  system 
down.  ( ... )  The complexity of  the Commission's system for financial control is 
the direct result of  growing pressures from the Court of  Auditors and from the 
Member  States  requesting  greater  accountability  and  transparency.  Each 
financial  transaction  is  thus  subjected  to  several  controls  carried  out  by 
different Units and Services,  which also have to check on each other's financial 
consistency.  In  practice,  it is difficult to discern a single Unit or official who 
carries overall responsibility and liability for the financial  correctness of the 
entire financing procedures undertaken by the Delegations." 
Notwithstanding  these  problems,  aid  implementation  has  been  good,  whenever  the 
Government has had the capacity to lead implementation and the Delegation has had the 
capacity  to  support Government  in  doing  so.  In  particular,  the  issue of Government 
capacity and commitment is central both to policy dialogue and aid management.  As far 
as the  latter is concerned, a recent study based on the analysis of 900 completed World 
Bank projects found that  "borrower performance is  most critical to determining project 
outcome.  Good borrower performance raises the probability of a  satisfactory outcome 
by 35 to 40 percentage points."
58 
Technical  assistance  should  complement  and  not  be  a  substitute  for  Government 
capacity.  When  Government  has  limited  capacity and  officials  are replaced  by TA, 
problems arise.  Project management units are created outside Government structures to 
implement particular projects/programmes or TA are attached to units  within the civil 
service.  TheTA can become the EC's day-to-day counterpart on the Government side, 
thus  undermining  Government's  capacity,  as  well  as  its  commitment,  to  the 
project/programme.  Given the relative capacity of the Zimbabwe civil service, donors 
should  focus  on  using  and  strengthening Government systems  (as  in  the  Agriculture 
Services and Management Project). 
57  European  Parliament  - Directorate  general  for  Research,  The  Management  Framework  of EU 
Delegations· Development Work in ACP Countries.  Case Study: Zimbabwe,  External Economic Relations 
Series Working Document no.  18,  November 1997 
58  OED,  The  Annual Review of Development Effectiveness  (ARDE),  November  1997,  The  World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
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